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The Limits of Anti-Obesity Public Health Paternalism:
Another View
KATHERINE PRATT
This Article critiques Professor David Friedman’s article, Public
Health Regulation and the Limits of Paternalism, and sets forth an
alternative view of the limits of anti-obesity public health paternalism.
Specifically, it critiques Friedman’s classification of public health
interventions based on how coercive the intervention is, and offers an
alternative construct to analyze paternalistic public health interventions.
The alternative approach, developed by Mark Hall, distinguishes between
(1) “old” public health interventions that target specific pathogens or
toxins, and (2) “new” public health interventions that target upstream
behavioral risk factors and ecological factors.
This Article then elaborates on the main example that Friedman uses
to illustrate his claims about coercive public health paternalism, the New
York City portion cap on sodas and other sugary drinks. By comparing
Friedman’s approach and the alternative approach, it shows that the latter
better explains the case that invalidated the sugary drink portion cap rule.
Moreover, this Article challenges Friedman’s assertion that the case is a
death knell for public health paternalism. Although the New York Board of
Health now faces formidable challenges with respect to promulgation of
new public health regulations, public health advocates in New York City
can continue to advance the new public health goal of reducing obesity
and diabetes in New York, by striving to foster greater political consensus
regarding the legitimacy of that goal and the best means of achieving it.
Beyond New York, in jurisdictions with less severe case law constraints on
agency action, state and local public health agencies may have greater
latitude to promulgate and enforce new public health regulations,
including anti-obesity regulations.

1903

ARTICLE CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................... 1905
II. FRIEDMAN’S APPROACH AND CLAIMS ............................................. 1906
III. CRITIQUE OF FRIEDMAN’S APPROACH AND CLAIMS .................. 1910
IV. THE SUGARY DRINK PORTION CAP EXAMPLE .............................. 1919
A.
B.
C.
D.

THE PROMULGATION OF THE SUGARY DRINK PORTION CAP RULE...... 1919
THE INVALIDATION OF THE SUGARY DRINK PORTION CAP RULE ........ 1921
FRIEDMAN’S INTERPRETATION OF THE CASE ....................................... 1923
AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE CASE ............................... 1925

V. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 1935

The Limits of Anti-Obesity Public Health Paternalism:
Another View
KATHERINE PRATT*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article comments on and critiques Professor David Friedman’s
article, Public Health Regulation and the Limits of Paternalism,1 and sets
forth an alternative view of the limits of anti-obesity public health
paternalism. Part II of this Article discusses the approach that Friedman
takes and the claims he makes, including the claim that coercive public
health paternalism has peaked. Part III critiques Friedman’s approach,
which classifies public health interventions based on how coercive the
intervention is, and offers an alternative construct to analyze paternalistic
public health interventions. The alternative approach, developed by Mark
Hall, distinguishes between (1) “old” public health interventions that target
specific pathogens or toxins, and (2) “new” public health interventions that
target upstream behavioral risk factors and ecological factors.
Part IV elaborates on the main example that Friedman uses to illustrate
his claims about coercive public health paternalism, the New York City
portion cap on sodas and other sugary drinks. Comparing Friedman’s
approach and the alternative approach, I show that the alternative approach
better explains the case that invalidated the sugary drink portion cap rule.
The defeat of the rule illustrates the perils of an executive agency acting
unilaterally, without legislative approval, to adopt new public health
interventions—especially in New York, where Boreali v. Axelrod2 imposes
severe constraints on agency promulgation of new public health
regulations. I disagree with Friedman’s assertion that the portion cap case
is a death knell for public health paternalism, however. Although the New
York Board of Health now faces formidable challenges with respect to
promulgation of new public health regulations, public health advocates in
New York City can continue to advance the new public health goal of
*
© 2014, Katherine Pratt. Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. LL.M.,
Corporate Law, New York University School of Law; LL.M., Taxation, New York University School
of Law; J.D., University of California Los Angeles School of Law; B.A., University of Florida.
Thanks to Trevor Belton for editorial comments and research assistance, Armita Sobhi for research
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1
David Adam Friedman, Public Health Regulation and the Limits of Paternalism, 46 CONN. L.
REV. 1687 (2014).
2
517 N.E.2d 1350 (N.Y. 1987).
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reducing obesity and diabetes in New York, by striving to foster greater
political consensus regarding the legitimacy of that goal and the best
means of achieving it. In addition, the Board of Health retains the ability
to promulgate and enforce old public health regulations—even highly
coercive regulations—notwithstanding the portion cap case. Beyond New
York, in jurisdictions with less severe case law constraints on agency
action, state and local public health agencies may have greater latitude to
promulgate and enforce new public health regulations, including antiobesity regulations.
II. FRIEDMAN’S APPROACH AND CLAIMS
In his article, Friedman makes both descriptive and normative claims
regarding the limits of public health paternalism. Although his primary
focus is on anti-obesity public health paternalism, he argues that his
conclusions are also broadly applicable to other types of public health
paternalism.3
But before turning to Friedman’s specific claims, note the rhetoric and
approach that he uses to frame his argument. His article is structured to set
up a dichotomy between “Free Market Approaches” and “Paternalistic
Approaches” to the obesity problem.4 Ultimately embracing a Libertarian
perspective, he extolls the virtues of autonomy and the free market.5 In
addition to drawing a distinction between highly coercive “hard”
paternalism and less coercive “soft” paternalism,6 Friedman theorizes a
paternalism spectrum with five categories, based on the degree to which
the intervention is coercive.7 This “coercion spectrum” ranges from
apaternalism, which eschews government interventions entirely in favor of
private market solutions, to highly coercive government bans and
mandates.8
3
See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1753–65 (discussing trends related to marijuana, fluoride, and
GMOs).
4
Id. at 1721, 1726.
5
Id. at 1767–68.
6
Id. at 1696 & n.38.
7
Id. at 1698–99.
8
Friedman lists the categories and discusses them at length in Part II.B of his article. The five
intervention categories along the spectrum are: (1) “Libertarian or apaternali[sm]” (no government
coercion is required because free markets and rational consumers with full information will address any
potential harm to consumers); (2) “Weak-form debiasing” (government provides “raw statistical and
factual information” to inform consumers of relevant data, which is a mild form of coercion); (3)
“Strong-form debiasing” (government provides a “concrete instance of the occurrence” or “truthful
narratives of harm” to illustrate potential harms, which is a stronger form of coercion but not an
absolute constraint on consumer choices); (4) “Insulating strategies” (“government protects consumers
by creating barriers to entry or hard-to-satisfy standards,” such as auto safety standards); and (5)
“Outright bans and mandates” (government prohibits consumers from making harmful choices or
requires harm-reducing action, in the strongest type of coercion). Id.
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Friedman states that the overall purpose of his article “is to assess the
role of paternalism in public health and whether paternalism, particularly
paternalism in its harder forms, has reached natural limits in terms of
popular viability and practical effectiveness.”9 His main descriptive claim
is that “[p]aternalism has peaked, for now, in the realm of public health
regulation,”10 because the public rejects hard paternalism and soft
paternalism is weak and ineffective.11 In other words, Friedman seems to
acknowledge that loss of autonomy, through government coercion, might
be warranted in some settings, but he expresses skepticism about the
political viability and effectiveness of various public health paternalist
interventions.
Friedman recognizes that public health advocates may feel morally
obligated to address the prevalence of obesity.12 Although he seems
sympathetic to their goals of reducing obesity-related morbidity and
mortality,13 he questions the need to intervene in free markets,14 as well as
the political viability and effectiveness of public health interventions.15
Friedman’s analysis includes a discussion of the role of free markets in
the current obesity problem. He notes that the increasing prevalence of
obesity has been caused, at least in part, by consumers making their own
“free choices” about which foods to consume.16 In other words, he
believes that obesity is not a problem to the extent that obesity results from
9

Id. at 1710.
Id. at 1694.
11
Id. at 1769.
12
Id. at 1768.
13
See id. at 1712 (describing obesity as a “grave public health issue”). Friedman is sympathetic
to the “new” public health goal of reducing behavioral risk factors that significantly increase
preventable disease and death—going as far as approving of less coercive and more coercive public
health interventions to reduce preventable disease and death:
10

Without a doubt, basic theories of both soft and hard paternalism would support
[anti-obesity government interventions, such as] . . . regulatory, pricing, and health
information mechanisms to substantially reduce salt and trans fats in prepared and
packaged foods and to support research that can find effective strategies for
modifying the other dietary, lifestyle, and metabolic risk factors that cause large
numbers of premature deaths.
Id. at 1712–13 (quoting Smoking, High Blood Pressure and Being Overweight Top Three Preventable
SCH.
PUB.
HEALTH
(Apr.
Causes
of
Death
in
the
U.S.,
HARV.
27, 2009), http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/press-releases/smoking-high-blood-pressure-overweightpreventable-causes-death-us/) (internal quotation marks omitted).
14
See id. at 1721 (positing that free choice itself may lead to “healthier decisions” in the battle
against obesity).
15
See id. at 1692 (describing a “general rejection of paternalism” of all kinds). Since, in his view,
hard paternalism is not politically viable and soft paternalism is weak and ineffective, Friedman argues
that public health advocates might consider doing nothing to intervene in the obesity problem:
“rejection of hard paternalism can lead regulators either to use strategies that preserve autonomy, or
simply to do nothing to regulate personal choices.” Id.
16
Id. at 1721.
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food consumers making the “choice” to be obese. In addition, he implies
that there may be no need for the government to intervene with respect to
obesity because the growth rate of obesity has leveled off, which in his
view indicates a “natural” upper limit to obesity rates.18 He also observes
that some free market responses, including food producer “voluntarism”
(i.e., self-regulation) and the expanding diet and weight loss industry, have
helped to reduce obesity rates.19 In his view, free markets and free choice
could, at least in theory, solve the obesity problem by allowing people to
satisfy their own preferences:
The most powerful solution available that eschews all
paternalism in favor of autonomy would be a natural
collective preference to engage in proper caloric intake and
energy discharge. Though other factors like genetics might
play into obesity, if these preferences, which would lead to
better health and longer life expectancy, were dominant, free
choice would lead to healthier decisions.20
Friedman acknowledges, however, that the free market approach has
not completely solved the public health obesity problem21 and concedes
that government interventions may be warranted to respond to certain
market failures, such as cognitive biases.22 In the obesity context, he
singles out the “present bias,” which causes consumers to focus almost
exclusively on the present consequences of actions and to ignore important
future consequences.23 In his view, a government intervention to “debias”
the present bias might be warranted, but only if the effectiveness of the
intervention is established.24 Although the main “drivers” of obesity are
known,25 Friedman doubts whether public health interventions can
significantly reduce the complex problem of obesity.26
In addition, the regulatory “full-court press” that Friedman believes is
required to effectively respond to the obesity problem is, in his view, not

17
See id. at 1720 (arguing that reducing obesity requires “changing the way people of different
ages, ethnic and racial backgrounds, and socioeconomic strata behave when they eat or drink”).
18
Id. at 1713.
19
Id. at 1722–24.
20
Id. at 1721.
21
See id. at 1726 (“The evidence overwhelmingly indicates that the obesity problem has not been
resolved by the combination of market forces and reactive intervention.”).
22
See id. at 1726–27 (“Regulatory strategies can be designed to address a bias or error that
interferes with decisions, leading people to make suboptimal or harmful choices.”).
23
Id. at 1728.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 1714
26
See id. at 1767 (“Undoubtedly, obesity presents a health crisis, but the complexity of the
contributing dynamics renders the problem difficult to solve.”).
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possible in the current environment. He discusses two specific obstacles
to comprehensive anti-obesity public health interventions. First, he argues
that public opinion is trending in favor of autonomy and against public
health paternalism, especially highly coercive, hard public health
paternalism.28 He concludes that, where autonomy and public health
paternalism are in conflict, Americans increasingly choose autonomy over
improvements in public health.29 Second, he argues that, although soft
paternalism might be more acceptable to the public, it would be ineffective
or inefficient.30 In light of these two obstacles, Friedman concludes that
anti-obesity public health paternalism cannot solve the obesity problem:
“[R]ecent developments in public health regulation indicate that regulators
may have a more limited range of tools going forward. In particular, when
looking at obesity . . . finding viable opportunities to change consumption
and physical activity patterns through hard paternalism proves difficult,
and soft paternalism can prove ineffective.”31
Friedman nonetheless expresses a normative claim that public health
regulators may be morally obligated to continue their efforts to reduce
obesity.32 Notwithstanding his pessimistic evaluation of anti-obesity
public health paternalism, Friedman says that paternalists should not wave
the white flag, because some strategies may be used to reduce obesity.33
First, he counsels that public health paternalists can sneak public health
paternalistic interventions (including hard paternalism) past the proautonomy/anti-paternalistic public by crafting the paternalism so that the
public does not notice that its autonomy has been constrained.34 Second,
he concludes that government can coerce more effectively in “Zones of
Control,” i.e., in food environments that are controlled by government,
instead of private markets.35 He provides two examples of such zones of
control: (1) schools (a zone of physical control); and (2) the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (a zone of legal control).36 Finally, he closes
27

Id. at 1719.
Id. at 1744, 1767–68.
29
Id. at 1767; see also id. at 1756 (noting in the marijuana context that “the public increasingly
desires to eschew paternalism in favor of more autonomy”).
30
See id. at 1768–69 (arguing that efforts to reduce obesity “would be blocked due to the
weakness of most soft paternalism strategies” and that “softer paternalistic efforts help debias at the
margin, but simply do not provide the power to put significant dents in this Gordian problem”).
31
Id. at 1693–94.
32
See id. at 1769 (“Should regulators surrender? Morally, that might not be an option. Scientists
and policymakers might have the obligation to play the paternal role, even if it proves unpopular.”).
33
Id. at 1769–70.
34
Id. at 1747–51. Friedman argues that “regulators can intervene somewhat more easily” in
“Zones of Intangibility,” which he describes as situations in which paternalistic constraints on
autonomy are “not felt.” Id. at 1747.
35
Id. at 1744.
36
Id.
28

1910

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1903

with a broader normative claim that public health regulators “should
pursue all solutions open to them” and rationalize their public health
regulations with cost-benefit analyses.37
III. CRITIQUE OF FRIEDMAN’S APPROACH AND CLAIMS
Friedman and I agree on some important issues. For example, we
agree that obesity is a major risk factor for most of the chronic diseases
that impair the health and quality of life of Americans and shorten their
lives.38 We also both agree that obesity is an important public health issue
that policymakers in our country need to address.39 In addition, I share
Friedman’s concerns about the increasing costs of obesity-related medical
care40 and agree that obesity is a complex problem with many inputs.41
He and I disagree about some of the facts of the obesity problem,
however. Friedman’s normative stance leads him to frame the facts in a
way that, in my view, misrepresents the current reality of obesity in
America. As a Libertarian, Friedman highly values autonomy and free
markets.42 He concedes, however, that his idealized free market would
make Americans healthier only if we had a “collective preference” for
healthy foods and exercise.43 In fact, we do not have such a collective
37

Id. at 1769 (emphasis added). Friedman elaborates on this advice to regulators:
Efforts should concentrate on the areas that science indicates would be the most
impactful, and which would be the most practical to implement.
For example, initiatives that harness the market and promote voluntarism in areas
that could matter (e.g., the voluntary changes made by food retailers), would meet
those criteria. Debiasing initiatives that prove effective while preserving autonomy
might prove weaker, but also could add up if enough of them were pressed.
Opportunities to deploy hard paternalism should be sought with care, so as to
minimize the perception that the regulators are usurping a tangible choice or are
treading beyond the zone normally ceded to regulators. These opportunities may
prove few, but if sought and pressed aggressively, they may have powerful effect.
Though the opportunities for deploying paternalism effectively in the public health
arena may prove limited, they do exist. If regulators minimize the perception that
they are reducing autonomy, perhaps the public might give more slack to initiatives
that tread on the border.

Id.
38
See id. at 1712 (noting obesity is the “third leading stand-alone risk factor” for preventable
deaths per year).
39
See id. (noting that “[w]ithout a doubt, basic theories of both soft and hard paternalism would
support interventions” to respond to obesity, which is “a grave public health issue.”).
40
See id. at 1714 (“[M]edical costs attributable to obesity rose from $78.5 billion in 1998 to $147
billion by 2008.”).
41
See id. at 1710 (“[O]besity presents perhaps the biggest and most complex public health
challenge facing regulators.”).
42
See supra text accompanying notes 5, 16–20.
43
See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1721.
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preference; at least in the current food environment, we have quite the
opposite collective preference. Our innate preferences for sugar, fat, and
salt in our diet conferred a survival advantage in a prior time, in which
food sometimes was scarce, and our tastes led us to consume a varied diet
of whole foods that provided healthy micronutrients as well as
macronutrients.44 In the current food environment, however, sugars and
fats occur not just in whole foods, but also in highly concentrated form in
processed food, much of which tastes quite delicious, but is highly caloric
and has little or no nutritional value; thus, our hard-wired tastes are
maladaptive in today’s food environment.45
Food markets suffer from various types of market failures, which may
warrant government intervention.46 For example, government can respond
to the market failure of “incomplete information” by mandating disclosure
or by compiling the missing information and disseminating it.47 Friedman
characterizes the provision of calorie counts for away-from-home foods
(e.g., food served in fast food restaurants and sit-down restaurants) as
“paternalism,”48 but I do not see it as such. Weight conscious food
consumers must be able to determine the calorie counts for the food they
eat. They can discern taste, price, value, and other important aspects of
foods; in the absence of calorie information, restaurants and food
producers compete on the aspects that consumers can discern, resulting in
increased calories in such foods.49 This missing calorie information creates
a market failure that justifies government intervention; regulations and
laws that mandate the provision of calorie counts benefit consumers who
want the information but otherwise cannot get it. Consumers who are not
concerned about calorie counts ignore them. Mandating information that
consumers want, to determine their own preferences, does not fit
Friedman’s definition of paternalism, which is implicitly “other44
Katherine Pratt, A Constructive Critique of Public Health Arguments for Antiobesity Soda
Taxes and Food Taxes, 87 TUL. L. REV. 73, 99 (2012).
45
See id. (“In an environment in which foods high in fat and sugar are plentiful, ubiquitous, and
cheap, however, these fast and frugal heuristics lead to systematic decision-making errors, obesity,
chronic disease, and reduced well-being.”).
46
See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 83 (1986) (explaining that
government can adopt market-corrective interventions to respond to market failures).
47
Id. at 90–91.
48
See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1733 (characterizing mandatory calorie disclosures as “soft
paternalism”).
49
See JAYACHANDRAN N. VARIYAM, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NUTRITION LABELING IN THE FOODSECTOR:
AN
ECONOMIC
ASSESSMENT
2
(2005),
available
AWAY-FROM-HOME
at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/err-economic-research-report/err4.aspx#.UzG07q1dVOw
(“Foods prepared away from home contain more calories per eating occasion . . . and are higher in total
fat, saturated fat, and cholesterol and lower in dietary fiber, calcium, and iron on a per-calorie basis
than food prepared at home.”); see also Devin Alexander, Restaurant Shockers: A Culinary Insider
Reveals 7 Ways Chefs Sabotage Your Diet When You Go Out to Eat, SHAPE, Oct. 2004, at 198
(discussing “common restaurant practices” that add hidden fat and calories to restaurant foods).
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regarding.”
In the context of food markets, internalities are another prominent type
of market failure. “Internalities” are costs, which are incurred by different
“selves” at different points in time and result in inadvertent harm to self
over time.51 Internalities typically result from cognitive biases and
heuristics.52 Friedman singles out “present bias” as “the primary cognitive
bias” that is implicated in the prevalence of obesity.53 One problem with
his discussion of present bias is that empirical evidence demonstrates that
common sense measures to debias often fail.54 In addition, present bias is
but one of many biases and heuristics that affect food and beverage
consumption and contribute to obesity. His single-minded focus on
present bias oversimplifies the complex processes that are involved in
eating “decisions.” In a previous article, I discussed an entire catalogue of
biases and heuristics, many of which are quite deliberately exploited by
food producers.55 The exploitation of consumer biases and heuristics by
the food industry raises concerns about the role of the food industry in the
obesity epidemic.
Friedman and I both regard food producers as important players in the
resolution of the obesity problem in America, but we disagree about what
it will take to encourage food producers to make their products healthier on
a grand scale. In his discussion of the role of free markets in obesity,
Friedman characterizes the food industry in an unrealistically beneficent
fashion.56 His application of the terms “paternalism” and “voluntarism” to
food industry self-regulation57 seems oxymoronic to me. Paternalism
implies a benevolent concern and intention for the well-being of others.58
50
See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1769 (“[P]aternalism [is] the ‘interference with a person’s liberty
of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or
values of the [other] person being coerced.’” (quoting Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, 56 THE MONIST
64, 65 (1972))).
51
See Jonathan Gruber & Botond Köszegi, Is Addiction “Rational”? Theory and Evidence, 116
Q.J. ECON. 1263, 1292–93 (2001) (discussing time-inconsistent preferences of present and future selves
and estimating the internal costs of smoking cigarettes).
52
See, e.g., Pratt, supra note 44, at 94–103 (discussing internalities in the context of making
decisions about foods).
53
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1720.
54
See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 272–
75 (2008) (concluding that efforts to debias by improving consumers’ financial literacy can backfire,
leading to worse decision making).
55
Pratt, supra note 44, at 100–06.
56
See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1722 (arguing that food industry “voluntarism,” to adopt antiobesity measures, “might emerge out of sheer private paternal goodwill”).
57
Id.
58
Friedman includes this aspect of paternalism when referring to an encyclopedia’s example of
paternalism: “a lifeguard presents a natural example of an omniscient, benevolent decision maker
responsible for public and individual welfare.” Id. at 1697 n.41 (emphasis added) (citing Paternalism,
NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Paternalism#Soft_vs._hard
_paternalism (last updated Apr. 2, 2008)).
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If the food industry adopts measures that might improve the well-being of
others, but takes that action for a “selfish,” defensive, profit-maximizing
reason, that action may be a free market response, but does not seem to fit
within the concept of paternalism. Corporations exist primarily to
maximize corporate profits, not to paternalistically care for the
corporation’s customers in ways that reduce corporate profits.59 Corporate
advertising may create the illusion that corporations care for us (e.g., “We
Do It All for You”), but those messages are merely marketing gimmicks
that are designed to manipulate us into buying certain products;60 that is
what for-profit corporations do, for good or ill. On that basis, I disagree
with Friedman’s assertion that food industry voluntarism to reduce obesity
can result from “sheer private paternal goodwill.”61 I agree with him,
however, that industry self-regulation “may simply be good for business[]
or . . . designed to pre-empt regulation.”62
Unlike many public health advocates, who cast the food industry in the
permanent role of arch villain in the obesity epidemic narrative,63 I am of
the view that the food industry could be part of the solution to the obesity
problem—but only if legislation or regulations change the legal landscape
so that meaningful self-regulation is in the economic best interests of the
industry and its shareholders. I agree with Critical Realists that, in the
current environment, food producers have every incentive to exploit
consumers’ cognitive biases and heuristics to encourage consumers to buy
more of their products.64 Consumer behavior does not always entail as
much choice as Friedman would have us believe, or even as much choice
as we all tend to believe we have. To date, left to their own devices, food
producers have competed primarily based on taste, price, shelf life, and
convenience, with no regard for the health consequences of their
products.65 The result is that Lunchables and Kraft Macaroni & Cheese
59
See Adam Benforado et al., Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J.
1645, 1689 (2004) (“In the United States, norms and laws lead corporations to pursue a common single
interest—profit maximization—and, in turn, the shared interests of encouraging markets, preventing
profit-restricting regulation, and supporting a conception of human behavior that enhances revenues.”).
60
See id. at 1709 (reciting various food industry slogans that are designed to create the
dispositionalist illusion, in the minds of exploited foods consumers, that they are in control of their own
food purchasing decisions and the impression that the industry exists solely to serve consumers).
61
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1722.
62
Id.
63
See, e.g., Zita Lazzarini & David Gregorio, Personal Health in the Public Domain: Reconciling
Individual Rights with Collective Responsibilities, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1839, 1847 (2014) (“[T]he
contemporary discourse about food preferences and lifestyle is significantly skewed by an industry that
benefits from the sale of items, regardless of the nutritional peril consumption poses to individuals . . . .
The burdens of poor diets visited upon individuals, households, or communities are negligibly borne by
the parties who encourage such consumption practices.”).
64
See Benforado et al., supra note 59, at 1694 (noting sales tactics that exploit biases for hot
meals or that appeal to “patriotic impulses”).
65
MICHAEL MOSS, SALT, SUGAR, FAT: HOW THE FOOD GIANTS HOOKED US, at xiii–xiv (2013).
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have become staples in the American diet.
Bob Drane, one of the
original developers of Lunchables, who now lectures on the role of the
food industry in the obesity problem, provided this recipe for success to
business school students:
Discover what consumers want to buy, and give it to them
with both barrels. Sell more, keep your job! How do
marketers often translate these “rules” into action on food?
Our limbic brains love sugar, fat, salt (scarce and high
energy). So, formulate products to deliver these. Perhaps
add low cost ingredients to boost profit margins. Then
“supersize” to sell more (# users x amount/user). And
advertise/promote to lock in “heavy users.” Plenty of guilt to
go around here!67
Notwithstanding the culpability of the food industry in the obesity
problem to date, there is much we can do to encourage the food industry to
develop healthier products. For example, First Lady Michelle Obama’s
“Let’s Move!” campaign68 sends a signal to food producers and retailers
that they need to engage in self-regulation or face the threat of bad
publicity or worse. In a previous article, I suggested that we develop a
federal food classification and front-of-package labeling system that would
classify foods as unhealthy, neutral, and healthy.69 This framework would
create an economic incentive for food producers to reformulate foods and
make them healthier.
According to Friedman, the growth of the diet and weight loss industry
is another laudable free market response to the obesity problem.70 In spite
of the growth of the weight loss industry, however, the overwhelming
majority of diets fail over the long run.71 It is easy to lose weight while
staying at Miraval Resort, a controlled environment in which physical
activity fills guests’ days and healthy, delicious food is served in small
attractive portions.72 In the real world, however, our jobs are sedentary;
our leisure time is short; and delicious, cheap, and convenient—albeit
66

Id. at 174–75, 184.
Id. at 210 (internal quotation marks omitted). Years after helping to develop Lunchables,
Drane developed a different perspective; he now “holds the entire [food] industry accountable for the
[obesity] epidemic.” Id. According to Drane, the epidemic is due to the “rise in corporate cooking,
processed and preserved foods, often high in sugar/fat/salt/etc. More calories in, less calories burned,
obesity up.” Id.
68
About, LET’S MOVE!, http://www.letsmove.gov/about (last visited July 15, 2014).
69
Pratt, supra note 44, at 138–40.
70
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1722.
71
See Pratt, supra note 44, at 116 (“[I]n the long run 95% of diets fail because, in the real world,
food cues in the obesogenic food environment are ubiquitous and compelling, although often hidden.”).
72
Miraval: An Overview, MIRAVAL, http://www.miravalresorts.com/overview/ (last visited July
15, 2014).
67
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unhealthy—foods and drinks are everywhere. In the obesogenic, realworld food environment, maintaining a normal weight is challenging.74
Although Friedman obviously is enamored with autonomy and free
markets, he does not focus exclusively on autonomy, unlike some
Libertarians. A welfarist normative orientation is implicit throughout his
article, although Friedman does not self-identify as a welfarist.75 Friedman
seems willing to consider other normative goals and values, in addition to
promoting autonomy, if doing so promotes social welfare. For example, he
expresses sympathy for the efforts of public health paternalists to reduce
obesity-related morbidity and mortality.76 Also, Friedman concedes that it
might be appropriate for the government to intervene to correct a market
failure if the market correction will be effective.77 This concession turns
out to be a straw man, however, because he doubts the effectiveness of
most market interventions.
Up to this point, Friedman’s views follow a familiar script, which
implies that it might be better to leave consumer preferences and markets
alone because regulators will make a mess of things.78 Critical Realists
note that the “dispositional” orientation (i.e., the belief that consumers
make their own “free,” independent decisions and are not affected by the
situations in which they find themselves)79 is helpful to businesses, in part
73

See Pratt, supra note 44, at 94–95.
See, e.g., BRIAN WANSINK, MINDLESS EATING: WHY WE EAT MORE THAN WE THINK 27
(2006) (“[W]eight loss [through dieting] is not mindless. It’s like pushing a boulder uphill every
second of every day.”). Nutritionist Marian Nestle shares a similar observation about the American
food environment: “Even if you know what is good for you, you are likely to have a hard time putting
principles into practice. . . . [I]n America today . . . it is very, very hard not to overeat.” MARION
NESTLE, WHAT TO EAT 11 (2006).
75
Friedman describes his approach to developing advice for public health regulators:
74

I note that moral justifications can be offered for different levels of paternalistic
intervention, but I do not make normative prescriptions based on morality. I advise
using restraint and expecting modest results from regulatory intervention in public
health, based on the reality of public attitudes toward paternalism and the
complexity of the problem being addressed.
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1697 n.40.
76
See id. at 1711 (“[I]t can be difficult to discern where and how regulatory efforts can be
deployed most efficiently and effectively to mitigate [obesity].”).
77
See id. at 1720 (“[T]he analysis must focus on the strategies that the public will support, or at
least not aggressively oppose.”).
78
See id. at 1720–26 (discussing “apaternalistic” measures geared towards the obesity problem).
79
Critical Realists Adam Benforado, David Yosifon, and Jon Hanson observe:
[C]orporations, as entities, are largely justified as socially beneficial from the
dispositionist perspective. If consumers are assumed to be dispositional—that is, if
they act according to a stable set of preferences that only they can assess directly—
then it follows naturally that the best way to maximize welfare is to allow consumers
to satisfy their preferences through free markets. It is through mutually beneficial
transactions that otherwise invisible preferences are satisfied and overall social
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because that orientation discourages the regulation of businesses to prevent
harms to consumers:
Markets, which allow the free exercise of dispositions, are
understood to be more responsive to consumer preferences
than regulators who lack good information and the
appropriate incentives. The dispositionist baseline translates
to a presumption against regulatory intervention even against
visible harms, for the actors involved are presumed to be
choosing the inevitable risks that gave rise to those harms.
Since the commercial interest merely responds to individual
manifestations of choice, responsibility for bad outcomes—
the giant gut and the cellulite thighs—can be squarely placed
on the consumer. Regulatory intervention is warranted only
in circumstances in which markets demonstrably fail to
respond to consumer dispositions—for instance, when
consumers clearly lack information or when a transaction
creates significant negative externalities. But, even in the
presence of such market imperfections, calls for regulation
may be rebutted on the grounds that imperfect markets are
preferable to imperfect regulations.80
Friedman goes on, however, to reach a conclusion that I found
surprising at first. Although he privileges autonomy, choices, and free
markets, he ultimately counsels public health regulators to try to overcome
the formidable political obstacles to public health paternalism by hiding
public health paternalism—even highly coercive hard paternalism—so that
Americans do not notice or feel the loss of autonomy.81 The only way that
an autonomy-loving Libertarian could reach this conclusion is by adopting
a welfarist normative stance, such as a utilitarian social welfare function,
which trades off welfare gains from improved health against the minimal
or nonexistent welfare loss caused by the hidden loss of autonomy.82
Under this view, it is the feeling or mental state accompanying loss of

welfare is increased. Profit is the substantiation of these welfare-enhancing
transactions and is therefore, by definition, good.
Benforado et al., supra note 59, at 1689.
80
Id. at 1689–90.
81
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1709, 1768. According to Friedman, “The forgone autonomy is
invisible or simply has no value. If opportunities to deploy hidden paternalism emerge, they can be
valuable for regulators to exploit.” Id. at 1709.
82
See id. at 1709 (suggesting that when a ban creates no visible reduction of individual choice,
but results in enhanced individual welfare, it is a practical and beneficial solution); see also id. at 1691
(stating that a common critique of libertarian paternalism is that it cannot be reconciled with state
efforts to promote social welfare).

2014]

THE LIMITS OF ANTI-OBESITY PUBLIC HEALTH PATERNALISM

1917
83

autonomy that creates a welfare loss, not the actual loss of autonomy. I
found it difficult to reconcile this recommendation—that public health
regulators should exploit hidden paternalism, even hard paternalism—with
the dichotomy between autonomy and coercion that dominates the article
as a whole. From the beginning of the article, Friedman stakes out a
position in favor of free market autonomy and against government
coercion. Throughout the article, he seems to disapprove of coercive
public health paternalism that limits autonomy, and one of his main claims
is that the public increasingly demands autonomy.84
The “coercion spectrum,” which is the main theoretical construct that
Friedman deploys in his article, classifies public health paternalistic
measures based on the degree of government coercion involved.85 One
could see why a Libertarian might distinguish between public health
interventions based on degree of coercion, as Libertarians highly value
autonomy, and coercion and autonomy are thought to be mutually
exclusive. Friedman’s theoretical classification system, however, is not
actually doing the work of distinguishing between well-advised and illadvised forms of public health paternalism. In addition, this “coercion
spectrum” would not help a policymaker decide whether to adopt a specific
public health proposal, regardless of where the proposed intervention is on
the spectrum of hard paternalism to soft paternalism.
Instead, I argue that a different sort of classification system is implicit
in the public health examples Friedman uses. The alternative classification
system, developed by Mark Hall, classifies public health interventions
based on whether the intervention:
(1) narrowly targets “a specific, identifiable pathogen or discrete
causal agent” that causes disease or death;
(2) more broadly targets behavioral risk factors, such as obesity, that
significantly contribute to chronic diseases and death; or
(3) even more broadly targets ecological and societal factors, such
as poverty and income inequality, that also significantly contribute
to disease and death.86
83
See id. at 1747 (“[S]ome hard paternalistic initiatives can be implemented without triggering the
perception of loss. If the regulators eliminate a truly poor choice, there should be an opportunity for a
welfare gain.”). A “mental-state” conceptualization of welfare focuses on subjective well-being. See,
e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 29
(2006) (“One type of mental-state view, pressed by Bentham, focuses on ‘pains’ and ‘pleasures,’
understood as positive and negative sensations or feelings.”).
84
See Friedman, supra note 1 at 1754 (finding that people are hesitant when “regulators restrict
personal choice” but they “applaud the addition of choice”).
85
Id. at 1698–99.
86
Mark A. Hall, The Scope and Limits of Public Health Law, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S199,
S206 (2003).
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Traditionally, public health law measures included only the first type
of intervention. This “old” public health focused on the control of
infectious diseases, pathogens, and toxins; provision of uncontaminated
drinking water and food; and sanitation facilities.87 To eliminate, reduce,
or contain identifiable pathogens and toxins, public health authorities had
police power to act, including the power to coerce; for example, public
health authorities could order a quarantine to contain the spread of an
infectious disease.88 In the context of fighting pathogens and infectious
diseases, the use of public health power to coerce is understood as
necessary, notwithstanding the fact that assertion of such power limits
individual freedom.89
“Old” public health interventions significantly reduced the incidence
of many preventable causes of disease and death, resulting in an
“epidemiological transition” in preventable causes of death.90 In today’s
world, most preventable diseases and deaths are attributable to broader
behavioral risk factors and ecological factors. The goal of reducing
preventable disease and death leads proponents of the “new” public health
to suggest that public health law be used to reduce behavioral risk factors,
including tobacco, alcohol, and drug use; unhealthy diet and activity
patterns; and risky sexual behaviors.91 Recently, public health advocates
have focused on anti-obesity public health measures as the “new frontier of
public health law.”92
The next Part of this Article considers the implications of applying (1)
Friedman’s “coercion spectrum,” and (2) Hall’s “old” public health and
“new” public health distinction, to the rule that limited the portion size of
sugary drinks served in New York City food service establishments to
sixteen ounces. The portion cap rule, which was promulgated by the New
York City Board of Health and subsequently invalidated by a New York
court,93 is the main piece of evidence offered by Friedman to support his

87
See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 9, 16–17 (2000)
(describing the historical traditional approach to public health).
88
Pratt, supra note 44, at 107.
89
See, e.g., Wendy E. Parmet, Quarantine Redux: Bioterrorism, AIDS and the Curtailment of
Individual Liberty in the Name of Public Health, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 85, 85–87 (2003) (comparing the
coercive public health measures adopted during the AIDS epidemic to proposed public health measures
that might be adopted to respond to incidents of bioterrorism).
90
Lawrence O. Gostin, Fast and Supersized: Is the Answer to Diet by Fiat?, 35 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 11, 11 (2005).
91
Id.
92
Michelle M. Mello et al., Obesity—The New Frontier of Public Health Law, 354 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 2601, 2601 (2006) (“The public health law approach posits that the law can be used to create
conditions that allow people to lead healthier lives . . . [because] the government has both the power
and the duty to regulate private behavior in order to promote public health.”).
93
See infra Part IV.B.–C.
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claim that anti-obesity public health paternalism “has peaked.” In my
view, the judicial invalidation of the portion cap rule is much better
explained by Hall’s construct than by Friedman’s coercion spectrum.
IV. THE SUGARY DRINK PORTION CAP EXAMPLE
A. The Promulgation of the Sugary Drink Portion Cap Rule
Reducing consumption of sugar-sweetened soda has been a focus of
public health advocates for several decades.95 During the last decade,
senior public health officials in New York City, under the leadership of
Mayor Michael Bloomberg, advocated for soda taxes to reduce soda
consumption.96 Although support for such taxes was strong in the public
health community, both the New York State Assembly and the New York
City Council repeatedly considered and rejected proposals to tax or
regulate the consumption of sodas and other sugary drinks.97 Although
Mayor Bloomberg subsequently abandoned the proposed soda tax,98 public
health advocates in the City continued to search for alternative means of
reducing soda consumption.
In a 2012 report, the New York City Obesity Task Force99 noted the
94

Friedman, supra note 1, at 1694.
See, e.g., Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Television Food Marketing to Children Revisited: The Federal
Trade Commission Has the Constitutional and Statutory Authority to Regulate, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
98, 100 (2010) (discussing a failed attempt, during the late 1970s, to regulate soda and junk food
television advertising directed towards children). Michael Jacobson of the Center for Science in the
Public Interest has been a longstanding advocate for public health measures to reduce soda
consumption. See MICHAEL F. JACOBSON, CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, LIQUID CANDY: HOW
SOFT
DRINKS
ARE
HARMING
AMERICANS’
HEALTH
(2d
ed.
2005),
available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/liquid_candy_final_w_new_supplement.pdf.
In 2000,
Jacobson and Kelly Brownell proposed a tax on sodas to discourage soda consumption and raise
revenue for anti-obesity programs. Michael F. Jacobson & Kelly D. Brownell, Small Taxes on Soft
Drinks and Snack Foods to Promote Health, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 854, 854–57 (2000).
96
See, e.g., Kelly D. Brownell & Thomas R. Frieden, Ounces of Prevention––The Public Policy
Case for Taxes on Sugared Beverages, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1805, 1806 (2009).
97
See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health &
Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607, at *5, *17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013), aff’d,
970 N.Y.S.2d 200 (App. Div. 2013) (cataloguing various “sugary drink” proposals that the New York
City Council and New York State Assembly considered and rejected).
98
Anemona Hartocollis, City’s Health Commissioner, in a Medical Journal Article, Calls for a
Tax on Soda, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2009, at A22.
99
Mayor Bloomberg convened the New York City Obesity Task Force and charged it with
developing and recommending “innovative, aggressive solutions to address the obesity challenge in
New York City.” N.Y.C., REVERSING THE EPIDEMIC: THE NEW YORK CITY OBESITY TASK FORCE
PLAN TO PREVENT AND CONTROL OBESITY 2 (2012) [hereinafter N.Y.C. OBESITY TASK FORCE
REPORT], available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2012/otf_report.pdf.
The Task Force
articulated four key goals for its work: (1) “Reduce obesity”; (2) “Address disparities between
communities”; (3) “Reduce preventable health conditions”; and (4) “Create strategies to lower health
care spending and lost productivity.” Id. at 3. The Task Force included commissioners from eleven
95
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nutritional effects of increased consumption of sugar-sweetened soda:
Americans consume about 200–300 more calories per day
than 30 years ago, with the largest single increase due to
sugar-sweetened drinks. Nearly half of added sugar we
consume is from sugar-sweetened drinks. There also has
been a significant increase in portion sizes over the past
several decades. The promotion of healthy eating includes
decreasing the consumption of foods and beverages that are
high in calories and nutrient poor and increasing the
consumption of foods and beverages that are low in calories
and nutrient rich.100
Also expressing concern about higher rates of obesity and greater
consumption of sugary drinks in poor neighborhoods and Black and Latino
communities,101 the Task Force set a goal of reducing New Yorkers’
sugary drink consumption by thirty percent by 2016.102 The Task Force
recommended that the city “[e]stablish a maximum size for sugary drinks
in food service establishments”103 to reduce excessive consumption of
sugary drinks. The idea was that changing the default portion size for
sugary drinks served in restaurants would make New Yorkers think more
consciously about how much soda they are drinking and “reacquaint New
Yorkers with ‘human size’ portions.”104
Based upon the Task Force’s recommendation, Mayor Bloomberg
proposed that the New York City Board of Health (the “Board of Heath” or
“Board”)105 adopt the sugary drink portion cap proposal.106 The Board of
Health published the proposed portion cap rule in the City Record, for
comment, and on July 24, 2012, it held a public hearing on the proposed
diverse New York City agencies and representatives from the mayor’s office, including the city’s Food
Policy Coordinator. Id. at 2–3.
100
Id. at 12 (footnotes omitted). The Task Force noted that sugary drinks are “ubiquitous” and
“are the leading items associated with excess intake of calories in adults.” Id. at 5.
101
See id. at 4 (noting that “the rate of overweight and obesity reaches 70 percent” in certain
Black, Latino, and low-income communities in New York City).
102
Id. at 7.
103
Id. at 14.
104
Id.
105
The Board of Health is part of the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene,
which is an executive branch agency with a public health orientation. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of
Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/12, 2013
WL 1343607, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013), aff’d, 970 N.Y.S.2d 200 (App. Div. 2013). The ten
members of the Board of Health and the chairperson are appointed by the Mayor. Id. Under the New
York City Charter, five of the ten Board members must be medical doctors and the other five, if not
doctors, must be experts in related scientific fields. Id. Dr. Thomas Farley, the Commissioner of the
New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, served as the Chairperson of the Board at
the time the Board adopted the portion cap rule. Id. at *3.
106
Id.
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rule.
Following the hearing, the New York City Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene prepared a memorandum, dated September 6, 2012,
for the Board of Health, summarizing and responding to comments and
testimony that the Board received.108 On September 13, 2012, the Board
met and adopted the sugary drink portion cap rule.109
The sugary drink portion cap rule110 applied to some, but not all, New
York City business establishments that serve sugary drinks. It applied to
“food service establishment[s],”111 including “restaurants, delis, fast-food
franchises, movie theaters, stadiums and street carts, but not to grocery
stores, convenience stores, 7-Elevens, corner markets, gas stations and
other similar businesses.”112 The “sugary drinks”113 it regulated included
sugar-sweetened sodas, energy drinks, and sweetened juices, but not
potentially more caloric types of drinks, such as alcoholic beverages, fruit
smoothies, milkshakes, and milky coffee drinks.114 Although the portion
cap rule limited the size of the container in which sugary drinks could be
served, it did not prohibit consumers from buying more than one sugary
drink, refilling a drink container, or adding any quantity of sugar after
purchasing a drink.115 Multiple plaintiffs challenged the soda portion cap
and sought to enjoin its enforcement.116
B. The Invalidation of the Sugary Drink Portion Cap Rule
New York Supreme Court Judge Milton Tingling invalidated the
sugary drink portion cap rule on the grounds that (1) it was “arbitrary and
capricious,”117 and (2) the members of the Board of Health “exceeded their
authority and impermissibly trespassed on legislative jurisdiction” when
they promulgated the rule.118 Judge Tingling held that the portion cap rule
107

Id. at *4.
Id.
109
Id.
110
24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.53 (2013).
111
Id. § 81.53(b).
112
Verified Article 78 & Declaratory Judgment Petition at 3, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic
Chambers of Commerce, 2013 WL 1343607 (No. 653584/12) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Petition].
113
The rule defined “sugary drink” as a beverage that: “(A) [was] non-alcoholic; (B) [was]
sweetened by the manufacturer or establishment with sugar or another caloric sweetener; (C) ha[d]
greater than 25 calories per 8 fluid ounces of beverage; and (D) [did] not contain more than 50 percent
of milk or milk substitute by volume as an ingredient.” 24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.53(a).
114
Plaintiff’s Petition, supra note 112, at 3.
115
N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 WL 1343607, at *6.
116
Id. at *1. The plaintiffs included the “New York Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of
Commerce, The New York Korean-American Grocers Association, Soft Drink and Brewery Workers
Union, Local 812, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, The National Restaurant Association, The
National Association of Theatre Owners of New York State, and The American Beverage Association.”
Id.
117
Id. at *20.
118
Id. at *6.
108
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was “arbitrary and capricious” because the rule did not apply to soda sold
by businesses other than “food service establishments,” did not apply to
certain categories of highly caloric beverages and sugar-sweetened
beverages, and permitted unlimited drink refills.119 These exceptions to the
rule “effectively defeat[ed] the stated purpose of the Rule,” which was to
reduce obesity.120
Judge Tingling analyzed the separation of powers issue by applying
Boreali v. Axelrod.121 In Boreali v. Axelrod, the New York Court of
Appeals invalidated a rule, promulgated in 1987 by the New York State
Public Health Council (“PHC”), which broadly prohibited indoor smoking
in most public places, with specific enumerated exceptions.122 (The PHC
adopted the rule after the state assembly rejected a broad indoor smoking
ban and instead enacted a narrowly drawn indoor smoking ban.123) Judge
Titone, writing for a majority, articulated four “circumstances” that led the
Court to conclude that the PHC had impermissibly usurped legislative
power in promulgating the broad indoor smoking regulations: (1) the PHC
balanced public health and “economic and social concerns,”124 as
demonstrated by various exceptions (based on economic and political
concerns) to the general rule promulgated; (2) the PHC promulgated the
rule “on a clean slate,” with no “legislative guidance”;125 (3) the PHC acted
“in an area in which the Legislature repeatedly had tried—and failed—to
reach agreement in the face of substantial public debate and vigorous
lobbying by a variety of interested factions”;126 and (4) the rule
promulgated by the PHC did not require specialized public health
“expertise or technical competence.”127
In the case involving the sugary drink portion cap rule, Judge Tingling
119

Id. at *20.
Id.
121
Id. at *8. For an argument against the use of the Boreali framework to analyze the sugary
drink portion cap rule, see Kara Marcello, Note, The New York City Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Portion
Cap Rule: Lawfully Regulating Public Enemy Number One in the Obesity Epidemic, 46 CONN. L. REV.
807, 842–44 (2013).
122
517 N.E.2d 1350, 1352 (N.Y. 1987). The PHC promulgated the rules pursuant to the authority
delegated to it by the New York State Legislature to regulate with respect to “matters affecting the
security of life or health or the preservation and improvement of public health.” Id. at 1358 (quoting
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 225 (McKinney 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The PHC’s
proposed rules would have prohibited smoking in schools, hospitals, retail stores, taxis and limousines,
indoor workplace common areas, and restaurants with more than fifty seats. Id. at 1352. An exception
to the indoor smoking prohibition applied to bars, to hotels, and to restaurants with fewer than fifty
seats. Id. In addition, the rules provided that businesses that did not qualify for an exception to the
indoor public smoking prohibition could apply for a waiver of the prohibition. Id.
123
Id. at 1357.
124
Id. at 1355.
125
Id. at 1356.
126
Id.
127
Id.
120
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held that the rule violated the separation of powers doctrine based on the
first three Boreali factors,128 because: (1) the exceptions to the sugary drink
portion cap rule indicated that the Board of Health impermissibly balanced
public health concerns and economic and political concerns;129 (2) the New
York City Charter does not grant the Board “the authority to limit or ban a
legal item under the guise of ‘controlling chronic disease,’”130 although it
grants the Board the power to promulgate regulations “that prevent and
protect against communicable, infectious, and pestilent diseases”;131 and
(3) the New York City Council and New York State Assembly repeatedly
had debated and rejected prior proposals to reduce consumption of sugary
drinks.132
C. Friedman’s Interpretation of the Case
The New York City sugary drink portion cap is Friedman’s prime
example of “flashpoint zones,” which he defines as “high-profile clashes”
that illustrate the recurring conflict between autonomy and coercive public
health paternalism.133 Based on the New York portion cap example, he
draws various conclusions about the limits of anti-obesity public health
paternalism. In addition, he argues that the limits of anti-obesity public
health paternalism can be generalized and are applicable to all public
health paternalism.134
After considering the degree of coercion that the New York City
portion cap entailed, Friedman places the portion cap on his “coercion
spectrum” by classifying it as an “insulation strategy,” meaning that he
views the portion cap as less coercive than a ban or mandate, but more
coercive than strong-form debiasing (persuasive narratives about risks),
weak-form debiasing (provision of neutral information about risks), and

128
N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health &
Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607, at *20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013), aff’d, 970
N.Y.S.2d 200 (App. Div. 2013). Judge Tingling noted that the four Boreali “factors” are considered
together, with no single “factor” being dispositive. Id. at *7.
129
Id. at *8–9. The economic considerations that the Board of Health relied upon included the
public costs of treating obesity. Id. at *9. The Board of Health also based the rule on political
considerations by making no attempt to coordinate the portion cap rule with the New York State
Department of Agriculture and Markets, despite a prior Memorandum of Understanding that required
coordination between the two bodies. Id. at *8–9.
130
Id. at *16.
131
Id. at *15.
132
Id. at *18. The portion cap rule did not violate the fourth Boreali factor, however, because the
Board of Health held a hearing on the draft rule and used its “expertise or technical competence” to
prepare a detailed memorandum, in which it discussed various medical and scientific studies. Id.
133
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1691–92.
134
See id. at 1753–54 (generalizing his conclusions about the limits of anti-obesity paternalistic
regulation to paternalistic regulation of marijuana and genetically-modified organisms).
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135

free market apaternalism.
Although he assumes that Mayor
Bloomberg’s goal was “to insulate consumers from the effects of overimbibing” in sugary drinks,136 Friedman counters that “[t]he facts . . . did
not support the notion that [the portion cap rule] would have any concrete
effect.”137 In support of his argument, he refers to Judge Tingling’s
conclusion that the portion cap rule “was arbitrary and capricious, exacting
a burden without a reasonable basis.”138
In his analysis of the implications of the case, Friedman observes that
New Yorkers “overwhelmingly opposed this autonomy deprivation, even
though the excessive consumption habit in question was only engaged in
by a small part of the public.”139 Essentially, Friedman argues that the
majority was not defending its own autonomy, but instead was defending
the autonomy of the minority––and autonomy itself. Based on the failure
of the portion cap, he concludes that “the public increasingly” rejects
paternalism as an unwarranted infringement of autonomy.140 His claim is
that the “trend” toward public rejection of anti-obesity public health
paternalism,141 especially “visible, hard paternalism,” significantly narrows
the options that will be available to public health advocates to reduce the
prevalence of obesity.142 He then generalizes his conclusion about antiobesity public health paternalism to other public health contexts, arguing:
[Other] flashpoint zones show a general rejection of
paternalism—especially visible, hard paternalism. This
leaves regulators with the more limited toolkit of soft
paternalism to attack some of the more difficult public
problems. In fact, a rejection of hard paternalism can lead
regulators either to use strategies that preserve autonomy, or
simply to do nothing to regulate personal choices.143
135

See id. at 1738 (determining the category in which the portion cap rule should be placed).
Id. at 1739.
137
Id. But see N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of
Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607, at *19–20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11,
2013) (finding that the Board had a “reasonable basis” for adopting the rule, but that the rule as
promulgated was “arbitrary and capricious”).
138
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1739.
139
Id. at 1740. Friedman stresses that the public rejected the portion cap notwithstanding the fact
that it “was mostly directed at others and targeted at a narrow category and manner of consumption.”
Id. at 1741. He reiterates that “a broad segment of [New Yorkers] objected to this kind of paternalism,
even though the regular consumption of large sweetened drinks was limited to a small subset of
consumers.” Id. at 1690.
140
Id. at 1757; see also id. at 1744 (“The reaction to the [portion cap] indicates that the public
attitude toward paternalism in contexts involving private consumption decisions may be trending
negative.”).
141
Id. at 1719.
142
Id. at 1692.
143
Id.
136
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Friedman thus makes the broad claim that “[p]aternalism has peaked, for
now, in the realm of public health regulation.”144
D. An Alternative Interpretation of the Case
What does the failure of the sugary drink portion cap teach us about
anti-obesity public health paternalism or about public health paternalism in
general? In my view, not exactly what Friedman claims it does. An
alternative interpretation of the New York City portion cap rule case is that
it illustrates the difference between (1) old public health interventions that
target specific pathogens or toxins, and (2) new public health interventions
that target upstream behavioral risk factors. In the context of old public
health interventions, public health regulators can easily justify their
interventions—even highly coercive, paternalistic interventions. In the
context of new public health interventions, however, public health
regulators face an uphill battle to justify their public health interventions—
even much less coercive interventions, such as “nudges.” This is
especially true where the public health regulators take unilateral regulatory
action without the guidance from the relevant legislative bodies or—worse
yet—in spite of the prior rejection of arguably similar interventions by
those legislative bodies.
Despite the invalidation of the sugary drink portion cap rule, public
health regulators in New York continue to have extensive power with
respect to old public health interventions, including interventions to
contain the spread of infectious disease or to promote food and water
purity and sanitation. With respect to old public health interventions,
public health regulators can promulgate rules that are located at any point
on Friedman’s coercion spectrum. For example, even highly coercive,
hard paternalistic interventions to eliminate deadly E. coli bacteria from
the food supply are widely considered to be appropriate and
uncontroversial.145 No one seriously argues that autonomy requires that
consumers be free to ingest E. coli; it is a pathogen and the first mission for
public health regulators of food is to ensure food safety.146 The traditional
powers of the Board, however, do not include the power to create new
144

Id. at 1694.
See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health &
Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607, at *16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013), aff’d, 970
N.Y.S.2d 200 (App. Div. 2013) (noting that the New York City Board of Health has the power to “call
for any [disease-causing] food to be destroyed”). For a list of recent outbreaks of foodborne illness in
the United States, see CAROLINE SMITH DEWAAL & MARCUS GLASSMAN, CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB.
INTEREST, OUTBREAK ALERT! 2001–2010: A REVIEW OF FOODBORNE ILLNESS IN AMERICA 6 (2013),
available at http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/outbreak_alert_2013_final.pdf.
146
See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 WL 1343607, at *16
(stating that the Board of Health may “supervise and regulate the food supply of the City when it affects
public health”).
145
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public health interventions to reduce unhealthy behavioral “risk factors.”147
What anti-obesity public health regulators fail to recognize is that new
public health interventions are much more controversial and difficult to
justify.148 To explore the difference between old and new public health
interventions, compare: (1) recent public health interventions to ban or
regulate substances that have been shown to be pathogenic or toxic,
including lead, trans fats, and tobacco; and (2) the New York City sugary
drink portion cap. The development of public health regulation of lead,
trans fats, and tobacco follows a similar chronology: the substance initially
was assumed to be safe; medical researchers hypothesized that the
substance, in fact, might be toxic; studies analyzed that hypothesis; results
of early studies were inconclusive; later studies proved an association
between the substance and certain specific negative health effects; and,
eventually, medical researchers established that the substance was toxic or
pathogenic.149 As evidence accumulated, public health interventions to
regulate the substance became increasingly proactive, interventionist, and
coercive. Now that researchers have proven the health risks of ingesting
small quantities of lead or trans fats and of smoking or chewing tobacco,
the public is insulated from those risks by way of bans, labeling

147
Hall, supra note 86, at S206; see N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce,
2013 WL 1343607, at *14 (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that amendments to the New York City
Charter significantly expanded the power of the Board of Health to address broader public health
issues). Judge Tingling stated: “[I]n looking at the history of the Charter, the intention of the
legislature with respect to the Board of Health is clear. It is to protect the citizens of the city by
providing regulations that prevent and protect against communicable, infectious, and pestilent
diseases.” Id. at *15.
148
Pratt, supra note 44, at 108–09. In a previous article, I offered public health advocates some
suggestions for developing and refining anti-obesity public health proposals: (1) distinguish between
the public health goal of obesity reduction, the public health goal of improved nutrition, and other
specific public health goals; (2) understand the implications of using an “externalities” justification to
support anti-obesity measures; (3) understand the implications of using an “internalities” justification to
support anti-obesity measures; (4) distinguish between “old” public health interventions that target
specific pathogens or toxins and “new” public health interventions that target upstream behavioral risk
factors; (5) offer empirical support for assumptions upon which public health proposals are based;
(6) explore the possible and likely intended and unintended consequences of the measure, considering
the benefits, costs, inefficiencies, and potential unfairness caused by the intervention; (7) consider
competing goals and values in addition to the anti-obesity public health goal; and (8) develop a
reasonable form of performance review for the intervention. See generally id. Perhaps some of these
suggestions could have helped the Task Force develop an alternate proposal for reducing the
consumption of sugary drinks, or at least articulate a more specific policy rationale for the portion cap
rule that better fit the predictable consequences of the rule.
149
See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 1, at 1707–08 (summarizing the chronology of the ban on lead
in paint); Artificial Trans Fat: A Timeline, CENTER FOR SCI. PUB. INT.,
http://cspinet.org/transfat/timeline.html (last visited July 15, 2014) (summarizing the chronology of
trans fat labeling and bans).
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requirements, or restrictions on use.
Compare the sugary drink portion cap rule. Soda is not a toxin and is
not per se “inherently dangerous.” The sugary drink portion cap rule thus
is a new public health intervention, not an old public health intervention to
eliminate or reduce exposure to a pathogen or toxin. Research cited by the
Board indicates that “excessive” consumption of sugary drinks is a
behavioral risk factor that contributes to obesity, diabetes, and various
other serious medical conditions.151 Although use of the word “excessive”
might at first seem subjective and judgmental, there is empirical support
for the Task Force characterizing consumption of super-sized sodas as
“excessive.” According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, “refined
sugars should provide no more than 6 to 10 percent of . . . total daily
calories,” to reserve enough calories for consuming the recommended
servings of various types of foods.152 For example, a teenager whose
recommended daily caloric intake is 2200 calories should not consume
more than twelve teaspoons of sugar per day.153 The average teenage boy
who drinks soda (or similar sugary drinks) consumes twenty-five ounces
per day, which includes over twenty teaspoons of sugar.154
Consuming such “excessive” refined sugar leads to one of two
outcomes, both of which are detrimental to health: (1) if a soda drinker
consumes soda in addition to consuming other foods and beverages that
meet recommended dietary guidelines, the individual will gain weight; or
(2) if a soda drinker avoids weight gain by reducing consumption of foods
that meet recommended dietary guidelines, the individual will lack
essential nutrients. Empirical evidence establishes: (1) “foods and
beverages high in added sugars are displacing more nutrient-rich foods in
the American diet;”155 (2) “[a] remarkably lower percentage of [heavy
consumers of added sugars] met their RDA for many micronutrients;”156
and (3) “disproportionately high percentages of lower-income Americans
(40 percent) and African Americans (44 percent) were heavy consumers of

150
See, e.g., TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, FEDERAL REGULATION OF TOBACCO: A
SUMMARY (2009), available at http://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/tclc-fdasummary.pdf (discussing federal bans on tobacco products).
151
See supra text accompanying notes 100–06; see also Marcello, supra note 121, at 819–22
(discussing the New York City Board of Health’s reasoning in enacting the portion cap rule).
152
JACOBSON, supra note 95, at 4.
153
Id.
154
Id. at ii; see The Nutrition Source, How Sweet Is It? Calories and Teaspoons
of Sugar in 12 Ounces of Each Beverage (2009), http://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wpcontent/uploads/sites/30/2012/10/how-sweet-is-it-color.pdf (stating that there are ten teaspoons of sugar
in twelve ounces of non-diet carbonated colas).
155
JACOBSON, supra note 95, at 6. “As teens have doubled or tripled their consumption of soft
drinks, they have cut their consumption of milk by more than 40%.” Id. at 5.
156
Id. at 7.

1928

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1903

157

added sugars.”
Put differently, “soft drinks pose health risks both
because of what they contain (extra calories, sugar, and various additives)
and what they replace in the diet (beverages and foods that provide
vitamins, minerals, and other nutrients).”158 Although the Task Force
focused on obesity reduction, its goal of reducing the empty calories from
soda also incorporates the important but distinct public health goal of
improving nutrition.159 Thus, the Obesity Task Force had a dual goal of
reducing both the obesity and the malnutrition that are attributable to the
consumption of large quantities of sugary drinks.
The stated goal of the rule, as articulated by the Obesity Task Force
and the Board of Health, was to reduce obesity.160 Judge Tingling
concluded that the rule was “arbitrary and capricious,” in part because the
portion cap rule did not apply to alcoholic beverages or to some sugary
drinks, such as milky coffee drinks, milkshakes, and fruit smoothies, which
are even more caloric than the drinks the portion cap rule regulated.161
Also, the portion cap rule allowed unlimited sugary drink refills and did
not prevent consumers from adding any quantity of sugar to their drinks.162
With so many seemingly inexplicable exceptions and loopholes, all of
which were inconsistent with the anti-obesity goal that the Board of Health
offered to justify the rule, Judge Tingling expressed concern that the
benefits of the portion cap rule would not materialize, much less justify the
costs of the rule.163
The Board could have done a better job of informing Judge Tingling of
the reasonable basis for the seemingly arbitrary and capricious application
of the portion cap rule to some sugary drinks, but not others.164 The Board
could have argued effectively that sodas and similar sugary drinks “are a
special problem.”165 If Judge Tingling had a better understanding of why
some drinks were covered by the rule but other drinks were not, he may
not have concluded that the rule was arbitrary and capricious. “Sugary
drinks,” as defined by the portion cap rule, were the target of the
intervention for a variety of specific reasons, including the following: (1)
reducing the consumption of sugary drinks, especially those that are
aggressively marketed to children, has been a continuing focus of public
157

Id.
Id. at 9.
159
N.Y.C. OBESITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 99, at 12.
160
See supra notes 99, 106 and accompanying text.
161
N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental
Hygiene, No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607, at *6, *20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013), aff’d, 970
N.Y.S.2d 200 (App. Div. 2013).
162
Id. at *8.
163
Id. at *6.
164
See Plaintiff’s Petition, supra note 112, at 3 (discussing the portion cap rule’s inclusion of
certain sugary drinks and detailing excluded beverages).
165
JACOBSON, supra note 95, at 12.
158
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health proposals since the late 1970s;
(2) sugar-sweetened soda is
disproportionately consumed in poor neighborhoods in which the
prevalence of obesity and Type II diabetes rates is disproportionately
high;167 (3) sugary drinks contain only “empty calories,”168 whereas drinks
that contain mostly milk or fruit, along with added sugar, at least have
some nutritional value;169 (4) sugary drinks are aggressively marketed by
beverage companies;170 (5) children, especially teens, are deficient in
calcium and other important nutrients, in part because they typically drink
soda instead of milk and juice, which increases the risk of osteoporosis and
broken bones;171 (6) high fructose corn syrup, a sugar syrup that is
commonly used in drinks that are subject to the portion cap, may have
more negative health effects than other types of sugars, such as the sugars
in milk, fruits, and vegetables;172 (7) sugary drinks, as opposed to drinks
containing milk or whole fruit, do not make us feel “full” and do not
reduce our overall intake of calories;173 and (8) sugary drink consumption
also may increase the risk of dental caries, kidney stones, and heart
disease.174
Also, sugary drinks are one of few specific, easily identifiable
categories of nutrient-poor, caloric foods or drinks that make up a double166
See Thomas R. Frieden et al., Reducing Childhood Obesity Through Policy Change: Acting
Now to Prevent Obesity, 29 HEALTH AFF. 357, 359 (2010) (discussing children’s exposure to
“extensive marketing and promotion of food items”); see also Gretchen Goetz, Three Studies Link
SAFETY
NEWS
(Sept.
24,
2012),
Sugary
Drinks
to
Weight
Gain,
FOOD
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/09/sugary-drinks-get-the-one-two-three-punch-from-obesityresearch/#.U01v6PldUVw (describing research that has been conducted regarding sugary drink
consumption since the late 1970s).
167
N.Y.C. OBESITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 99, at 8, 13.
168
JACOBSON, supra note 95, at 8.
169
See id. at 19, 26 (comparing soft drinks to healthful foods).
170
See id. at 19–23 (describing aggressive marketing strategies used by beverage companies to
market their products and providing estimates of amounts beverage companies spend on advertising);
see also HARVARD SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, FACT SHEET: SUGARY DRINK SUPERSIZING
AND
THE
OBESITY EPIDEMIC 1 (2012), available at http://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wpcontent/uploads/sites/30/2012/10/sugary-drinks-and-obesity-fact-sheet-june-2012-the-nutritionsource.pdf (“Beverage companies in the US spent roughly $3.2 billion marketing carbonated beverages
in 2006, with nearly a half billion dollars of that marketing aimed directly at youth ages 2–17. And
each year, youth see hundreds of television ads for sugar-containing drinks. In 2010, for example,
preschoolers viewed an average of 213 ads for sugary drinks and energy drinks, while children and
teens watched an average of 277 and 406 ads, respectively. Yet the beverage industry aggressively
rebuffs suggestions that its products and marketing tactics play any role in the obesity epidemic.”
(footnotes omitted)).
171
JACOBSON, supra note 95, at 13.
172
See id. at 11–12 (discussing the contribution of high fructose corn syrup to weight gain and
obesity).
173
See N.Y.C. OBESITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 99, at 14 (discussing the increased
intake of calories in relation to feeling full after consuming sugary drinks). High-protein foods and
drinks and high-fiber foods and drinks create a full feeling, but sugary sodas do not.
174
JACOBSON, supra note 95, at 14–16.

1930

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1903

175

digit percentage of American caloric intake.
The extraordinarily large
aggregate volume of “sugary drinks” consumed by Americans, especially
children and teenage boys and girls, makes sugary drinks a prominent
target for obesity reduction.176 The idea is that sugary drinks provide a
simple, identifiable point of leverage against obesity; put simply, public
health regulators think that eliminating or significantly reducing soda
consumption could reverse recent increases in obesity.177
In addition to better articulating the reasoning for specifically targeting
sugary soda and similar nutrient-poor, caloric sugary beverages, the Board
could have better explained the reasoning for using a portion cap to try to
reduce soda consumption.178 Imposing a portion cap on soda was
motivated by two separate public health goals: (1) countering the fast food
industry super-sizing trend; and (2) reducing excessive consumption of
nutrient-poor, caloric sugary drinks. Portion sizes of “sugary drinks” have
increased dramatically in the last thirty years.179 Super-sized sugary drinks
increase beverage industry profits because consumers focus myopically on
the salient aspect of added value, without understanding the subtle way in
which their caloric intake and, in the long run, their weight increases.180 In
other words, larger portion sizes increase caloric consumption without
consumers realizing that that their caloric intake has significantly
increased.181 Among high calorie drinks, sodas are sold in super-sized
175
Id. at 1, 10 (“Carbonated soft drinks are the single most-consumed food in the American
diet . . . .”).
176
See N.Y.C. OBESITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 99, at 12 (articulating an initiative to
“[e]ncourage [h]ealthy [e]ating” by focusing on the reduction of New Yorkers’ consumption of sugary
drinks); see also JACOBSON, supra note 95, at 1–3 (documenting large quantities of sugary drinks that
are consumed in the United States and particularly noting the soda consumption by children, teenagers,
and young adults).
177
See N.Y.C. OBESITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 99, at 7 (discussing the implementation
of initiatives that would reduce the prevalence of obesity, including reducing sugary beverage
consumption).
178
Having ruled out soda taxes, the Obesity Task Force and Board of Health focused on
establishing a maximum portion size for sugary drinks that would counter the super-sizing trend for
sugary drinks. Id. at 14. Brian Galle argues that “nudges” can be more efficient than traditional
interventions, such as Pigouvian taxes. See Brian D. Galle, Tax, Command . . . or Nudge?: Evaluating
the New Regulation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 837, 857–59 (2014) (explaining why nudges can work and what
they depend on). One of the advantages of the New York City sugary drink portion cap was the way in
which the rule specifically targeted the problematic overconsumption of soda, instead of
indiscriminately subjecting all consumption to regulation or taxation. See id. at 885 (explaining that the
New York City Health Department targeted soda for the portion cap because “soda contributes
significantly to obesity” and that “[s]ize limits are better targeted at soda-drinkers’ potential
internalities than a tax would be”).
179
See N.Y.C. OBESITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 99, at 13 (illustrating “Exploding
Beverage Sizes” with a graph demonstrating 457% growth in drink size).
180
See JACOBSON, supra note 95, at 3 (providing sample pricing for smaller portions of drinks and
larger, value-added portions of drinks).
181
See WANSINK, supra note 74, at 69–70 (noting that the serving size bias affects caloric
consumption even if the consumers have been educated about serving size bias and concluding that
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containers more often than other high calorie drinks that Judge Tingling
mentioned in the opinion (e.g., milkshakes).182 According to the Obesity
Task Force, the portion cap rule would “reacquaint New Yorkers with
‘human size’ portions to reduce excessive consumption of sugary
drinks.”183
The sugary drink portion cap was supposed to gently tip the scales
back toward less gargantuan portion sizes for nutrient-poor, caloric sugary
beverages. Although Judge Tingling seemed to think that allowing refills
would prevent the portion cap from being effective,184 he did not
understand that the portion cap was not designed to be a “ban” that
prevented consumers from drinking more than sixteen ounces of soda; it
was supposed to reduce consumption more subtly by framing sixteen
ounces as a normal portion size and making consumers stop and think
about whether they actually want to drink more than sixteen ounces of
soda.185 If Judge Tingling had better understood the reasoning behind the
sugary drink portion cap rule, he may not have concluded that the rule was
arbitrary and capricious.
The portion cap rule nonetheless would have been invalidated because

“[n]o one is immune to serving-size norms––not even ‘intelligent, informed’ people who have been
lectured on the subject ad nauseum”). “In the end, setting the table with the wrong dinner plates or
serving bowls—the big ones—sets the stage for overeating.
And there are heavyweight
consequences . . . .” Id.
182
See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health &
Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013), aff’d, 970
N.Y.S.2d 200 (App. Div. 2013) (listing caloric drinks that are not subject to the sugary drink portion
cap rule).
183
N.Y.C. OBESITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 99, at 14.
184
See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 WL 1343607, at *6
(observing that “no restrictions exist on refills further defeating the Rule’s state purpose”).
185
See id. at *6, *8 (explaining that the portion cap does not “preclude unlimited free refills or
multiple purchases of 16-oz. beverages or providing unlimited sugars after purchase . . . but does limit
the containers at self service fountains to be limited to 16 oz irrespective of whether a consumer is
purchasing water or one of the non-regulated drinks”). The Obesity Task Force or Board of Health
could have reduced the costs of the sugary drink portion cap rule by limiting drink containers to a size
just smaller than the truly super-sized thirty-two and sixty-four ounce drinks. The standard size
container for a bottled soda is twenty ounces, although a 16.9 ounce container also is widely used. See
Mike Esterl, Coke Tailors Its Soda Sizes—Backing Off of “Supersizing,” Company Aims for Wider
Range of Ounces, Prices, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2011, at B4 (describing Coke’s launch of new bottle
sizes “represent[ing] a departure from years of relying heavily on three basic packages—20-ounce
bottles in convenience stores and two-liter bottles and cases of 12-ounce cans in supermarkets”).
Imposing a sixteen ounce container limit would require bottlers of sugary drinks to reconfigure their
molds and production processes, at great expense to them. Perhaps the implicit goal of the portion cap
rule was to require exactly this type of container reformulation in order to shift standard soda portion
sizes back toward the smaller portion sizes of years past. The costs of forcing bottlers and distributors
to reconfigure their production processes might be quite disproportionate when compared to the
benefits of reducing the standard drink portion size by either .9 ounces (from 16.9 ounces to sixteen
ounces), or by four ounces (from twenty ounces to sixteen ounces).
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of the extent to which the Board attempted to usurp legislative power.186
Going forward, this aspect of the portion cap case presents a formidable
barrier to promulgation of new public health regulations by the Board of
Health. Boreali v. Axelrod seemingly does not permit a New York
administrative agency to take into consideration any “ends” that might
conflict with the ends that the agency is charged to pursue. The Board of
Health, which is charged with maximizing the health of New Yorkers,
violates Boreali if the Board takes into account any political or economic
considerations in fashioning a public health rule.
There is an irony implicit in the Boreali test. The first Boreali factor
considers “whether the challenged regulation is based upon concerns not
related to the stated purpose of the regulation, i.e., is the regulation based
on other factors such as economic, political or social concerns?”187 The
only way that an executive agency can avoid running afoul of this factor is
to myopically disregard information other than information that pertains
directly to the agency’s charge, for example the Board of Health’s charge
to promote health. An administrative agency’s weighing of competing
interests, such as “economic, political or social” considerations,188 is a
factor that counts against the agency in the Boreali analysis.189 The idea is
that the legislature has the power to balance such competing interests, but
an administrative agency does not have that power.190
In a previous article, I advised public health advocates to examine
critically the empirical assumptions upon which their new public health
proposals rest, and consider carefully both the intended and unintended
consequences of their proposals.191 In effect, my suggestion is that public
health advocates perform, at a minimum, a rough, qualitative form of costbenefit analysis.192 Performing such an analysis, which requires a
186

See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 WL 1343607, at *20
(expressing grave concerns about the portion cap rule eviscerating the separation of powers doctrine).
187
Id. at *8.
188
Id.
189
See id. at *8–9 (noting that “the statement of financial costs related to the chronic epidemic
further evidences a balancing being struck between safeguarding the public’s health and economic
considerations,” and holding that such balancing “violates the first prong of Boreali”).
190
See id. at *16 (“It is the province of the people’s elected representatives, rather than appointed
administrators, to resolve difficult social problems by making choices among competing interests.”
(quoting Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1356 (N.Y. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
191
Pratt, supra note 44, at 75 (arguing that public health advocates should consider both intended
and unintended consequences of public health interventions, including soda taxes).
192
According to Adler and Posner:
[Cost-Benefit Analysis] is a procedure that measures the impact of agency choice on
a plurality of aspects of human welfare using a money scale. Frequently, however,
agencies compare the welfare “costs” and “benefits” of their choices in a more
qualitative way. Policy effects will be described, and indeed might be quantified on
various scales (for example, numbers of deaths, . . . jobs lost or gained), but no
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balancing of competing costs and benefits, appears to be prohibited under
Boreali. The Boreali separation of powers objection would seem to apply
to any new public health interventions that balance competing goals,
because Boreali stands for the proposition that such balancing more
properly is the subject of legislative decision-making.
If a statute enacted by the legislature specified that the Board of Health
(in New York City, or the Public Health Council in New York State) could
balance competing interests to reduce the prevalence of obesity and
diabetes and provided some guidelines for performing such balancing,
Boreali may not bar the Board from promulgating new public health
regulations. In the portion cap case, however, the Board promulgated the
rule without any legislative guidance. Not only was the Board operating
on a “clean slate,” with no legislative guidance,193 it acted in
contraventionone might even say defianceof the City Council’s
rejection of soda taxes and soda regulation proposals, as well as the overt,
public disapproval of certain members of the City Council.194 Judge
Tingling endorsed the view expressed in the petitioners’ brief that the
Board’s promulgation of the sugary drink portion cap rule was designed as
an “end-run” around the legislature.195
That aspect of the rule
196
promulgation was fatal.
Judge Tingling concluded that the Board’s
actions exceeded their power to act: “To accept [the Board’s] interpretation
of the authority granted to the Board by the New York City Charter would
leave its authority to define, create, mandate and enforce limited only by its
imagination.”197
Under a literal interpretation of Boreali and the sugary drink portion
cap case, a public health regulation promulgated by the New York Board
of Health without prior legislative guidance or subsequent ratification by
the City Council cannot survive a separation of powers challenge unless
monetary scale for commensurating all these impacts will be deployed. Instead, the
trade-off will be done more intuitively.
ADLER & POSNER, supra note 83, at 73.
193
See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 WL 1343607, at *17,
*28–29 (noting that an agency writes on a clean slate when it “creates its own set of comprehensive
rules without the benefit of legislative guidance” and concluding that amendments to the New York
City Charter did not provide legislative guidance regarding agency regulation of legal unadulterated
foods to control chronic diseases).
194
See Plaintiff’s Petition, supra note 112, at 1, 30 (noting the “public objection of 17 members of
the City Council” to the sugary drink portion cap rule).
195
See id. at 1 (arguing that the portion cap rule was “imposed by executive fiat [and] usurps the
role of the City Council” and that “[t]he proposal was immediately recognized for what it was an
end-run around the City Council”).
196
See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 WL 1343507, at *20
(indicating that the Board’s promulgation of the portion cap rule violated separation of powers
doctrine).
197
Id.

1934

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1903

the regulation pertains to an imminent, discrete, per se public health hazard
or threat. Also, in developing and promulgating rules, the New York
Board of Health must focus exclusively on maximizing health (i.e., it is
prohibited from balancing public health and economic or political ends),
unless the legislature has delegated to the Board the authority to engage in
such balancing and has specified the manner in which the Board is to
perform such balancing of competing ends.
Boreali, in effect,
conceptualizes an administrative agency as performing only the ministerial
work of filling in the blanks of a statute, in a manner specified by the
legislature, instead of forming and implementing specific policies to
further the broad policy goals delegated to the agency by the legislature.
Beyond New York, state and local public health agencies that are not
hamstrung by Boreali probably have much greater latitude to continue to
develop and promulgate new anti-obesity regulations. For example, the
public health agencies in Boston and in Washington State, which like the
New York City Board of Health have promulgated public health
interventions that target chronic diseases including obesity, may continue
to proactively innovate in the interest of public health.198
Public health regulators in New York City and elsewhere remain free
to independently promulgate old public health regulations (including
highly coercive regulations) that reduce or eliminate a specific pathogen or
toxin. Eventually, research may establish that sugary drinks (or potentially
certain “doses” of sugary drinks) are pathogenic or toxic, similar to lead,
trans fats, and tobacco.199 If proof develops, as it did for lead, trans fats,
and tobacco, public health regulators will have greater power to regulate
soda. Until they have that proof, however, they will face an uphill battle if
they continue to adopt unilateral new public health regulationseven
interventions that are not very coercive—to reduce soda consumption. For
now, public health advocates appear to overreach when they say that soda

198
See, e.g., Paul A. Diller, Local Health Agencies, The Bloomberg Soda Rule, and the Ghost of
Woodrow Wilson, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1859, 1879, 1882 (2013) (describing regulatory actions of
the Boston Public Health Commission, an independent state agency, and the King County-Seattle
Board of Public Health, an agency that enacts some of the most aggressive public health regulations).
199
See Lori Dorfman et al., Soda and Tobacco Industry Corporate Social Responsibility
Campaigns: How Do They Compare?, 9 PLOS MED., June 2012, at 5 (concluding that “[e]merging
science on the addictiveness and toxicity of sugar, especially when combined with the addictive
properties of caffeine found in many sugary beverages, should further heighten awareness of the
product’s public health threat similar to the understanding about the addictiveness of tobacco
products”). See generally Robert H. Lustig et al., The Toxic Truth About Sugar, 482 NATURE 27, 28,
29 (2012) (advocating that sugarspecifically soda and other sugary beveragesshould be regulated,
proposing that the justifications for alcohol regulation“unavoidability (or pervasiveness throughout
society), toxicity, potential for abuse and negative impact on society”apply to sugar, and pointing to
“successful . . . control strategies” for tobacco and alcohol that can serve as “[a] reasonable parallel for
sugar”).
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must be regulated like lead in paint.
Make no mistake: the invalidation of the sugary drink portion cap case
was a significant defeat for the New York City Board of Health and will
make it much more difficult, going forward, for the Board to promulgate
new public health regulation. The defeat of the portion cap rule does not
signal the end of public health paternalism, however. In the future, the
Board simply will have to do a better job of advocating for its new public
health proposals to garner the support of the City Council and the public.
Local public health agencies that are not subject to the severe rule
promulgation restrictions imposed by Boreali v. Axelrod will have greater
freedom to promulgate new public health regulations without advance
legislative approval. They nonetheless should clearly articulate the values
that motivate their proposals, to enlist the support of legislators and the
public.
V. CONCLUSION
Making the food environment less obesogenic will require government
intervention, or at least a plausible threat that government will intervene if
the food and beverage industry does not rein in obesity. As I have
indicated in a previous article, I support anti-obesity interventions that
meet performance standards. Public health advocates should recognize,
however, that new public health interventions to reduce obesity raise
heightened objections about the executive branch usurping legislative
power to the exclusion of competing goals. Mayor Bloomberg’s
administration and public health regulators in New York are to be
commended for their good intentions, their passion for improving the
health of New Yorkers, and their development of innovative
interventions—some of which have turned out to be effective.
The invalidation of the sugary drink portion cap rule is a serious
setback for the New York Board of Health. The portion cap case and the
reassertion of the strict administrative constraints imposed by Boreali v.
Axelrod will hamper the ability of the New York Board of Health to
promulgate innovative anti-obesity regulations without the approval of the
legislature. The case demonstrates the significant risk of unilateral
adoption by public health regulators of new public health interventions.
Going forward, public health advocates—especially public health
advocates in New York—will need to do a better job of advocating for
their goals and involving the legislature and the public. I recommend that
200
See, e.g., David Rosner & Gerald Markowitz, Why It Took Decades of Blaming
(Apr.
22,
2013),
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Banned
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Paint,
THE ATLANTIC
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/04/why-it-took-decades-of-blaming-parents-beforewe-banned-lead-paint/275169/ (advocating that public health agencies not delay soda regulation, based
on lessons learned from delaying lead paint regulation).

1936

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1903

smaller scale pilot projects be used to test anti-obesity interventions that
show promise and to establish the costs and benefits of proposed
interventions. The interventions that are most successful can generate
legislative proposals that are supported by empirical research. Anti-obesity
public health advocates should: (1) clarify their multiple public health
goals and articulate them clearly; (2) develop proposals that are a good fit
for the goals articulated; (3) consider both intended and unintended
consequences of the proposals; and (4) try to build consensus for the most
promising proposals.
Although the portion cap case prohibits New York public health
agencies from balancing public health goals and competing economic and
political ends, the legislature is free to balance competing concerns. In
New York, and even in jurisdictions in which public health agencies have
greater latitude to innovate without legislative authorization, I urge antiobesity public health regulators to build the empirical case for specific
anti-obesity interventions and take their argument to the public and the
legislature. The sugary drink portion cap case shows that, at least in New
York, courts will invalidate rules that implement unilateral new public
health interventionshighly coercive or otherwiseand are promulgated
by an executive agency as an end-run around uncooperative legislators.
Instead of defying the legislature, public health paternalists everywhere
should make such a compelling case for public health interventions that
even uncooperative legislators cannot in good conscience refuse.
Ultimately, Friedman and I reach slightly different conclusions about
the future of anti-obesity public health paternalism: he is pessimistic and
sees the glasssixteen-ounce or otherwiseas half empty, while I am
optimistic and see it as half full.

POSTSCRIPT
The New York Supreme Court Appellate Division
decision cited in this Article was affirmed by the New
York Court of Appeals in N.Y. Statewide Coalition of
Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Department
of Health & Mental Hygiene, 23 N.Y.3d 681 (2014),
after this Article was selected for publication.

